Claimant v Secretary of State for Justice

The tribunal found the Claimant resigned of her own volition because she wanted to pursue an alternative career and attend university, not because of any repudiatory breach by the Respondent. The Respondent did not act in a manner calculated or likely to destroy trust and confidence. There was no fundamental breach entitling the Claimant to resign.

The Claimant failed to establish a prima facie case of less favourable treatment because of her race. The tribunal found that where the Claimant and comparator Matthew Harrison (a white male) were in comparable circumstances (e.g. suspension, investigation, disciplinary process), they were treated identically. Delays and procedural issues were not attributable to race but to administrative confusion, the Claimant's own grievance submissions, and her sickness absence.

The Claimant did not establish a prima facie case of direct disability discrimination and failed to put the allegations to Respondent witnesses in cross-examination. The tribunal found no evidence that disability influenced any decision-making or treatment.

The tribunal did not find as fact that the Claimant was unable to stand for long periods, so this could not be something arising from her disability. Even if wrong, the tribunal accepted the Respondent's treatment was justified as a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim of maintaining professional standards and trustworthiness in the prison workforce.

The tribunal accepted the Claimant did protected acts (raising a grievance alleging race and disability discrimination and appealing it). However, it found the decision-makers either did not know of the protected acts (e.g. Ms Stone issuing sickness absence warning) or that the detriments (final written warning, alleged failures in process) were not because of the protected acts but were responses to the Claimant's proven gross misconduct and legitimate procedural requirements.