Claimant v Cliff College

The tribunal found the claimant was dismissed for some other substantial reason: his tweet brought the respondent into disrepute and breached trust and confidence. The reason was potentially fair. The investigation was reasonable, the procedure was fair, and the decision to dismiss fell within the band of reasonable responses. The claimant refused to take down the tweet despite serious reputational damage. No less discriminatory option was available.

The tribunal found the treatment was not because of the claimant's evangelical Christian beliefs but because of the language used in the tweet and the reputational damage caused. The respondent dismissed the claimant due to the reaction and risk to reputation, not the belief itself. The dismissing officer even agreed with some of the claimant's theological views. The protected characteristic was not the reason, or even a significant cause, of the treatment.

The tribunal found the alleged PCP was not made out. The respondent did not apply a policy of treating social media posts expressing rational views as misconduct solely because they provoked controversy. If such a PCP had existed, it would have been a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim of protecting the college's reputation, ensuring dignity and respect for students and staff, and compliance with the social media policy. Action short of dismissal was not proportionate given the claimant's refusal to remove the tweet or comply with policy.

The tribunal found none of the 13 alleged acts of harassment were established. Each act was either a reasonable response to the reputational crisis, proportionate to protect the college's interests, not related to the claimant's religion or belief, or did not have the proscribed purpose or effect. The acts were undertaken to manage the fallout from the tweet and protect students, not to harass the claimant because of his evangelical Christian beliefs.